Introduction to the special issue : globalization thirty years on : promises, realities and morals for the future by Galent, Marcin & Soborski, Rafał
The International Journal of Interdisciplinary Global Studies 
Volume 15, Issue 4, 2020, https://onglobalization.com 
© Common Ground Research Networks, Marcin Galent, Rafal Soborski,  
Some Rights Reserved, (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) 
Permissions: cgscholar.com/cg_support 
ISSN: 2324-755X (Print), ISSN: 2324-7568 (Online) 
https://doi.org/10.18848/2324-755X/CGP/v15i04/0-0 (Issue)
Introduction to the Special Issue 
GLOBALIZATION THIRTY YEARS ON: 
PROMISES, REALITIES AND MORALS FOR THE FUTURE 
………………………………… 
SPECIAL ISSUE EDITORS 
Marcin Galent, Jagiellonian University in Kraków 
Rafal Soborski, Richmond the American International University in London 
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The last decade of the twentieth century was a momentous period in contemporary history. A 
revolutionary wave that started in Poland in 1989, and continued in Hungary, East Germany and 
elsewhere, led to the end of Soviet domination in Central and Eastern Europe, and ultimately the 
collapse, in 1991, of the Soviet Union itself. Today, the contrast between the current direction that 
the world is headed and the accelerated globalization of the 1990s is pronounced. While in the 
aftermath of the Soviet Bloc’s defeat, the discourse of capitalist triumphalism prevailed—with 
Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis as its most influential example (Fukuyama 1992)—
three decades on, more cautious assessments are in order. Although global capitalism—especially 
of a particular, neoliberal kind—has maintained its tight grip over almost the entire globe, the 
obituaries written in the early 1990s, for social democracy, the state, the nation, sometimes 
modernity itself, now seem utterly premature. Far from homogenizing the world, the processes of 
globalization have clashed with tendencies toward fragmentation, globalism has been undermined 
by nationalism, and the hegemony of free-market economics is often described as zombie-like, 
exhausted by challenges both on the right and the left (Peck 2014). The articles gathered together in 
this special issue of the International Journal of Interdisciplinary Global Studies look back at the 
hopes that were invested in the new world of the 1990s as it was emerging out of the ashes of the 
great ideological battles of the twentieth century, consider what went wrong to produce its 
unforeseen dysfunctions, and postulate some tentative ways to get out of the multiple crises we find 
ourselves in at the outset of the 2020s. In this introductory article we map the insights provided in 
the following four contributions to this issue—by Darren J. O’Byrne, Paul Kennedy, Andrew Z. 
Katz, and Zdzisław Mach—while complementing them with our own observations. The first part 
takes a brief look at how the 1990s were interpreted by intellectuals and commentators at that time. 
The second part descends from the realm of dreams to the realities on the ground and sheds some 
light on recent developments, including the rise of national populism. Finally, the third part, which 
is more explicitly normative in nature, takes a glimpse into the future. 
When the World Was Being Flattened 
The end of the Cold War opened the way to a far-reaching and multidimensional social 
transformation on both sides of the former geopolitical divide (Soborski 2013). Perhaps most 

























communication. Indeed, technology played a major role in the collapse of statist communism as 
well as triggering the meteoric rise of international non-governmental organizations worldwide. 
In terms of political economy, the possibility of cheap real-time communication across any 
distance, in conjunction with the reduction of trade barriers, enabled outsourcing of many 
processes and segments of production. The resulting extension of economic operations to 
worldwide scales facilitated a more effective externalizing of the costs of capitalism. The new 
opportunities for capital accumulation, in combination with the disintegration of the model that 
had for seventy years posed a real challenge to the capitalist system, left the latter triumphant, at 
least for a decade or so, in spite of the massive turbulences brought about by its recurrent crises. 
At the same time, the capitalist system itself was also being transformed in comparison with the 
Keynesian type dominant for much of the post-Second World War period in Europe and, to some 
degree, in the United States. The increased mobility of capital, along with the assumed 
weakening of state-managed regulatory mechanisms, gave capitalism an unapologetic face, 
leading to grave socio-economic problems, such as unprecedented inequality and environmental 
degradation worldwide. Resistance to these outcomes of the capitalist economy was expressed, 
on a discursive level at least, with unparalleled emphasis on transnational solidarities, while the 
organization of the protest was mediated by new communication tools that have proved able, 
now and then, to circumvent control by the authorities. 
Journalists, politicians and business gurus rushed to explain this set of diverse technological, 
political and economic developments while social sciences became “full of enthusiasts claiming 
that a new form of human society is emerging” (Mann 2000, 1467). In the quest to find a 
common denominator to explain the transformation, the concept of globalization was turned into 
a key buzzword of both political discourse and social inquiry, an idea that was allegedly capable 
of capturing the meaning and implications of the new realities. The intellectual climate of that 
time and the then centrality of the concept of globalization is masterly explored in the next article 
by British sociologist Darren J. O’Byrne. O’Byrne demonstrates how the claims purporting 
epochal changes in various areas of social life implied a major paradigm shift with globalization 
at the very heart of the transformation. For O’Byrne, the globalization debate, particularly in its 
early development, had a distinctly apocalyptic connotation that was played out in four 
interrelated dimensions captured by the discourses of the four “ends”: of ideology, history, 
organized capitalism and the nation-state. O’Byrne provides an insightful overview of competing 
interpretations that social scientists have offered to make sense of the post-Cold War order. He 
shows that they often amplified the sense of novelty and rupture, indeed projecting the Zeitgeist 
of that short period as the Weltgeist of a new era. But, as O’Byrne remarks, this proved to be 
only a “transitory apocalypse” and almost as soon as globalization was thrown onto the world’s 
stage, its obituaries began to be published. We will return to the end-of-globalization debate 
shortly—and briefly, as the account provided by O’Byrne is unbeatably nuanced and witty—but 
first, what was that new era expected to deliver?  
The potential of globalization to benefit everyone was touted in the nineties and noughties 
by the neoliberal establishment. The dominant narrative revolved around the prospects for 
prosperity and peace to be achieved through globalization of the “free” market economy. To get a 
glimpse into the prevailing ideological vibe of the time it is worth recalling the prolific author 
and celebrity of the New York Times, Thomas Friedman, and his peculiar take on the democratic 
peace theory that he peddled as Golden Arches—and later Dell—Theory of Conflict Prevention. 
Friedman wrote “When a country reached a level of economic development where it had a 
middle class big enough to support a McDonald’s network, it became a McDonald’s country. 
And people in McDonald’s countries didn’t like to fight wars anymore, they preferred to wait in 
line for burgers” (2000, 249). According to the hegemonic narrative of the time, the rising tide of 
globalization was a harbinger of peace and prosperity that could lift all boats. However, it was 
also presented as unforgiving to any dissent from the orthodoxy of neoliberal economics. Thus, 
Friedman advised states in no uncertain terms to “accept the verdicts of the global markets” and 
“be ready to take punishment” (2000, 363). Similar narratives reifying the global market and 


























populated the pages of neoliberal news-outlets press. While many more examples could be 
given—neoliberals never underestimated the power of ideas to establish and consolidate 
hegemony and their ideological output has been invariably voluminous and consistent (Soborski 
2018; also see Soborski 2009)—it is perhaps most appropriate to turn to a politician whose career 
had spanned almost the entire post-Cold War era until it was cut short, or at least interrupted, by 
her defeat in the 2016 USA Presidential elections. Going back to October 1999, the then First 
Lady, Hillary Clinton spoke at a conference in Warsaw that was to set the “lessons for the next 
decade.” She said: 
Choosing the path of democracy, free markets, and freedom required great vision, 
courage, and moral leadership.…Certainly I have seen that here in Poland. This nation is 
a testament to the fact that democratic and free market reforms, when decisively and 
thoroughly implemented, do work. It’s been three years since I last came to Warsaw, 
and in those years, much has changed. New businesses and shopping centers are moving 
into neighborhoods. New cars are crowding once empty streets. Cell phones are ringing 
in cafes, parks, and sidewalks—that’s an annoying indication of progress. But all of 
them are signs that a new middle class, the backbone of any democracy, is emerging. 
(Clinton 1999) 
Poland had indeed been a recipient of a “decisive and thorough implementation” of a radical 
neoliberal restructuring that Naomi Klein (2007) labelled “shock therapy”; the country is one of 
the main case studies of Klein’s punchy critique of neoliberalism. Thus, Clinton’s excitement 
was not shared by everyone and, as time progressed, and with the problems associated with 
neoliberal globalization becoming ever more acutely felt, the voices of its discontents were 
becoming louder if often inchoate. With the benefit of hindsight—or perhaps even without it, just 
by drawing on what we know about the nature of free-market fundamentalism—it is obvious that 
the dysfunctionalities generated by neoliberalism had to pave the way to the crisis of 
globalization which culminated (so far) in the 2016 election of a far-right plutocrat into the 
world’s most powerful office. To explore this connection a bit further, let us now turn to our 
contributors’ accounts of what happened between the “end of history” and its tumultuous return. 
The Crisis of Globalization or the Globalization of Crisis? 
The notion of the decline of globalization—just like the idea of its rise some thirty years ago—
serves today as a convenient formula that means to capture the fundamental problems facing the 
world, and particularly the societies of the global North. Whereas globalization was once an all-
pervasive buzzword heralding a new era in human history, so likewise the discourses portending 
its end have, for some time now, organized a significant share of the debate about social change 
in the last two decades. O’Byrne draws our attention to four crises that have served as major 
focal points in social theorizing about current global developments. They are the crises of 
capitalism, human rights, liberal democracy and the left. They are interrelated and linked with the 
four dimensions of the “apocalypse” that O’Byrne locates at the origin of globalization. 
Particular attention should be paid here to the crisis of human rights as O’Byrne is the world’s 
leading scholar in this field. His account takes us back to a post-Cold War vision of a 
cosmopolitan order firmly underpinned by the idea of human rights, to be defended, if necessary, 
by democratic imperialism and military interventions. However, while various kinds of 
arguments in defense of human rights, more or less vaguely conceived, have come from often 
unexpected corners, and for sometimes blatantly insincere reasons—think of one of G. W. Bush 
administration’s justifications for USA invasion of Iraq—the lack of a cohesive political force 
behind the discourse has meant that it could not deliver its progressive promise. Without 
adequate political backing and global organizational infrastructure to support it, human rights 
discourse has not changed the world—not yet, in any case—in the way its universalist advocates 
intended. Contrary to expectations discussed by O’Byrne, the nation-state refused to go away and 


























nature of the rights of the citizen remains acutely clear. Indeed, recent developments have 
brought this distinction into a sharp relief, for instance when the automatic right to naturalization 
of spouses and even children was arbitrarily withdrawn in some countries (UK Government 
2014). Human rights are increasingly interpreted as vested only in citizens of states, an obvious 
contradiction in terms for citizenship is by definition exclusive. 
The ongoing rise of national populism further reinforces these tendencies. Contrary to the 
liberal ideal of political community open to everyone regardless of nationality, ethnicity or class, 
the national populist vision is nativist, aiming at particularization rather than inclusion. National 
populism looks for enemies, internal as well as external, including native cosmopolitan elites 
within nations; it mobilizes followers by drawing boundaries and separating the inside from the 
outside. It aims to purify the nation by symbolically “expelling” the members deemed corrupt or 
unworthy. While populism itself is a rhetorical style rather than a mature system of political 
beliefs, and as such can attach itself to different political agendas or ideologies, not necessarily 
exclusive, the post-Cold War left has not, thus far, succeeded in articulating a compelling 
narrative to counter the populism of the right. Indeed, O’Byrne criticizes the left’s failure to 
engage with globalization in order to transform it. Much of the left has capitulated to—if not 
implicitly embraced, as was the case with the Third Way—the neoliberal model of globalization 
where the market is the ultimate arbiter of what is fair and good, competition is rife, and 
individualism and inequality reach levels that, as Andrew Katz’s article published in this issue 
demonstrates, make social trust extremely hard to attain. On the other hand, where leftists did 
mobilize against neoliberalism, this was usually with a protectionist agenda in mind, in 
contradiction to the internationalist, cosmopolitan legacy that lies at the source of the Western 
tradition of progressive politics. Instead of calling the proletariat— or, perhaps more aptly today, 
the “precariat”—of all countries to unite, the leading figures of the left, notably Bernie Sanders 
and Jeremy Corbyn, positioned themselves primarily as defenders of the rights of the American 
or the British workers. The left wasted the opportunities that opened up for it on several recent 
occasions—most importantly when neoliberal deregulation caused the greatest crisis of 
capitalism for almost a century (Soborski 2018, 2020)—and, thus far, has not formulated a 
narrative with a potential to challenge neoliberalism on a global level.  
Paul Kennedy, the late British sociologist of globalization, and one of the founders of global 
studies in the UK, provides further prescient insights into the current crisis that he examines 
through the prism of the shifting political economy both on national and global levels. According 
to Kennedy, the main factors shaping the current (dis)order are the new type of capitalism, which 
he describes as vampiric in nature, and technological change that enables the functioning and 
expansion of this form of capital accumulation while introducing new patterns of social 
stratification. Deindustrialization and computerization have brought about a rapid growth in the 
possibilities of communication and political representation, but have also led to severe 
turbulences in the labor markets of many advanced societies. While in the Western world social 
and territorial inequalities were lessening during much of the previous century, the years leading 
up to the turn of the millennium and the two decades that followed it have brought a sharp 
reversal of this more egalitarian trend. The swift rise in inequality has led to a widespread feeling 
of alienation and lost influence over the direction of changes set in motion by the forces of 
globalization and overseen by political and cultural elites. The development of cognitive 
capitalism has brought an enormous sense of frustration into entire social groups incapable of 
finding a place for themselves in the new and volatile context. Owing to a dramatic reduction in 
social mobility, especially in countries most committed to neoliberal restructuring, like Britain or 
the USA, the idea of meritocracy has lost any practical credibility. Stemming from economic 
marginalization of large sections of Western societies is their growing discontent which 
translates into hostility to everything cosmopolitan or “globalist.” As Kennedy demonstrates, the 
discontent increasingly reflects territorial inequalities within nations. Angry political reactions, 
ranging from street riots to Brexit and the presidential win of Donald Trump in 2016—that came 
respectively from the “yellow vests” in France and their equivalents elsewhere, “the North” in 


























politics of protest. Driven by this rage is the push for decisive action and “solutions,” manifested 
either in the demands to settle complex questions through referenda, as in the British case, or in 
support for strong leaders, ready to challenge the “liberal” establishment, as in Poland and 
Hungary. In the process, the norms of liberal democracy become the targets of the populist 
backlash or are just abandoned like “orphans at the end of history,” in the evocative phrasing of 
Andrew Z. Katz, professor of political science at Denison University. 
For Katz, a major cause as well as consequence of the rise of right-wing populism is a 
continuing decline in the public trust in elites. In social sciences, trust is viewed as fundamental 
to a proper functioning of any society—its weakening is therefore a key indicator of the decay of 
social cohesion. Obviously, trust is a complex concept and so its erosion cannot be reduced to a 
few unambiguous variables. Instead, it is associated with a broad range of cultural, economic and 
social factors. Katz highlights in particular the materialistic ethos, the increase in competition and 
the spread of the winner-takes-all mentality as threatening the sense of trust. The uncritical shift 
towards a comprehensive marketization that followed the collapse of statist communism in 
Europe, has meant a subordination of a wide range of global processes to economic imperatives 
and an application of the market logic to almost any aspect of human interaction. Katz lays part 
of the blame on the academia and, more broadly, the dominant intellectual milieu which has been 
colonized by the kind of rationality that Max Weber viewed as the main danger associated with 
modernity and Jürgen Habermas (1986) opposed on post-Enlightenment grounds. Specifically, 
the intellectual paradigm underpinning the crisis of constitutional liberalism revolves around the 
concept of rational choice. The materialistic, rational, and market-driven society that it conjures 
is merely a contractual aggregate of individual interests with deep fissures between classes, 
identities, and regions. The gaps may become so large that they render any meaningful sense of 
community all but impossible. As a consequence, the foundations of liberal-democracy—norms 
that require an appropriate dose of reasoned deliberation, respect for expertise, the law, 
established procedures and institutions, indeed an intersubjective acceptance of facts—are 
undermined or “orphaned.” Again, the implications are most notoriously demonstrated by the 
Brexit campaign as well as the communication flowing from the office of President Trump. They 
have led to a growing concern with the so-called “post-truth” politics. This may be accompanied 
by attacks on the rule of law which, according to populist voices influential in recent years in 
Poland or Hungary but also the UK, must not be in contradiction with “the sovereignty of the 
people.” Of course, the crisis of liberal democracy is undermining its legitimacy not only 
amongst the domestic public but also in the eyes of the rest of the world. As Katz points out, 
while Fukuyama expected that humankind would eventually converge on liberal principles and 
institutions, the rivals of the West, especially China and Russia, are now challenging it not just 
through their economic influence and military might, but also through soft power. Indeed, their 
visions of political order have proven appealing to a number of illiberal leaders on the peripheries 
of the Western world, including Jarosław Kaczyński in Poland, Victor Orbán in Hungary, or 
Recep Erdoğan in Turkey.  
The article by Polish sociologist and founder of European studies in Poland, Zdzisław Mach, 
is also a passionate defence of liberal principles. Mach’s focus is on the crisis of European 
integration, which he considers through the prism of culture and identity. His article follows the 
developments in Europe in the wake of the collapse of the Iron Curtain. This was greeted with 
enthusiasm both in the East and the West: Europe had been divided by rival ideologies but it was 
expected that the end of the Soviet Bloc would pave the way to the continent’s unity. Three 
decades later, much of this optimism has evaporated, and the border between the former West 
and the former East seems anything but vanished, despite the economic success of the countries 
formerly under the Soviet control, which are rapidly catching up with the standard of living of 
Western European societies. According to Mach, the loss of hope in the project of European 
unity is related to a pervasive cultural anomy stemming from the failure to work out a canon of 
shared values to support a robust collective identity. Paradoxically, this anomy has its origins in 
the fall of the Berlin Wall which had performed the function of a symbolic boundary demarcating 


























unanimously considered the cornerstone of European culture. Their value was beyond dispute as 
long as the Eastern Bloc lingered on as the counterpoint of the liberal Europe. The common 
adversary meant that internal differences between Western Europeans seemed marginal and 
common features were emphasized; with the adversary’s defeat, the symbolic field of 
Europeanness became host to a new rivalry over how to define European values, or indeed 
whether there is such a thing. The multi-dimensional and multi-threaded effort to reconstruct 
European identity is now encountering increasingly significant hindrances. The fault lines in this 
battle of ideas reflect not only the historical heritage of individual countries and regions, but also 
the new geopolitical fractures related to the crisis of governance on the global level.  
While Mach’s focus is mainly on questions revolving around culture and identity, he 
acknowledges that one trigger of the EU’s current problems was the crisis of the dominant 
economic model, which led to widespread disappointment with the direction of European 
integration and to a decline of public confidence in the elites at the helm of this supranational 
project. We would like to explore this thread a bit further. The Great Recession and then the 
systemic crisis within the euro area, led the EU to face an existential threat. The rescue of the 
bankrupted global financial sector devoured up to a third of the richest countries’ GDP, and the 
lifebuoy was the taxpayers’ money which led to a ballooning public debt and draconian austerity 
measures. The scale of the disaster exceeded even the collapse of the planned economy model in 
1989. It turned out that the dysfunctionality of neoliberalism, on which the architecture of the 
common currency relies, overwhelmed the sense of community and solidarity between 
Europeans. It is no wonder that, in the absence of adequate social protections at either national or 
supranational levels, the economic experiment adopted under the influence of the neoliberal 
paradigm proved destabilizing if not outright destructive (Galent 2016). Considering the context 
of increasing social and territorial inequalities and progressive pauperization of large socio-
economic groups, it was naïve to expect that European citizens would be willing to engage in 
intercultural cooperation for regional peace and shared prosperity. European identity, after all, 
remains weaker than traditional national identities; hence, if economic polarization caused huge 
rifts in national communities within such consolidated democracies as the UK, the USA, or 
France, then it should not come as a surprise that it also weakened the supranational ties within 
the EU as well as bringing to power illiberal leaders in some post-communist EU member states, 
such as Poland and Hungary. It is worth reiterating that during their post-Cold War transition the 
latter countries were subjected to a particularly comprehensive socio-economic restructuring 
based on rigid neoliberal criteria. The “shock therapy” that they underwent replicated the 
experiment in free market fundamentalism that had been imposed in the 1970s on Chile by 
Pinochet’s military junta hand-in-hand with neoliberal economists from the Chicago School 
(Klein 2007). In short, the unquestionable significance of the cultural superstructures 
notwithstanding, it is vital to also keep the economic base firmly in mind when analyzing 
political tensions within the EU and the illiberal turn in Central Europe and elsewhere. 
What is to be done? 
The foregoing discussion may seem disheartening: a rapidly rising inequality, liberal democracy 
in crisis, decline in the sense of community, increasing prejudice, and much else, all rooted in a 
flawed economic system. However, when considering that system, or the dominant mode of 
globalization that it has spawned, it is important not to reify it as politicians are so keen to do to 
absolve any responsibility for their own failures. Globalization is not a fatum that falls upon us 
by the will of god or nature. It is a complex set of processes, often contradictory and incredibly 
complex, but ultimately a social creation and subject to human agency. It is to questions of our 
collective ability to shape the outcomes of globalization that we now turn. Each of our 
contributors provides compelling answers to the problems they identify, in each case the 
solutions they propose are informed by their respective priorities; taken together they constitute a 
compelling framework for change. 
The departure point for Kennedy’s normative argument connects well with what we have 


























globalization as such, but rather resistance to the direction of travel initiated in the late 1970s. 
The problems sown by the roughshod application of neoliberal dogma worldwide should not 
obscure the potential for a collective pursuit of a better world that is implicit in globalization. 
That ideas of shared prosperity and cooperation have been relegated to the background of social 
development theory and practice is not related to human nature, but rather a result of the 
economic model that has been forced upon the world in the course of the past four decades. Thus, 
we should not throw the globalization baby out with the neoliberal bathwater. While its 
undesirable and dysfunctional aspects need to be acknowledged and tamed, globalization also 
entails positive attitudes: openness to cultural diversity and interaction, and a shared 
responsibility for others, regardless of where they live. We would add that even in its economic 
aspects—which, in their current form, are rightly blamed for inequality and marginalization of 
large swathes of humanity—globalization has a potential to improve the lot of many people 
worldwide. When supplemented with appropriate redistribution mechanisms, economic openness 
can bring prosperity, while isolationism and autarky almost always do more harm than good. 
Contrary to popular perceptions, the most open economies are those where, like in Sweden, 
everyone shares the benefits as well as the risks of the country’s immersion in global trade 
(Rodrik 1998)—unfortunately, this remains an exception with the rule being the privatization of 
profits and socialization of losses. While Kennedy views globalization as inevitable, he 
emphasizes the human need to feel connected, rooted and at home. Local life is as valuable as the 
metropolitan, cosmopolitan and global dimensions of our collective existence. Local identities 
provide some sense of security amid economic turmoil. Family and neighborly ties constitute an 
important network of economic, social and emotional support. On the other hand, atrophy of 
social bonds engenders a sense of loss of agency and social alienation. Importantly, robust local 
identities can also facilitate integration of immigrant population. Whereas the national 
imaginaries of the host countries may not immediately resonate with immigrants, it is usually a 
natural process for them to start identifying with places, people and symbols that they encounter 
in everyday life. The sheer fact of living in the same street and neighborhood can forge a 
collective identity transcending ethnic, religious and national boundaries. Kennedy discusses a 
plethora of reasons why it is important to commit to a revival of the local and cherish its sense of 
place-based intersubjectivity and posits a number of strategies to facilitate this. The guiding 
principle should be democratization, not just of local authorities, but also local businesses, for 
example through various forms of co-operatives, to give residents a real voice and sense of 
empowerment. Importantly, this does not imply a weakening of social movements or collective 
action and representation on transnational or global levels. The idea is to rejuvenate local 
communities, politically and economically, while opening them to democratic communication 
and cooperation with others so that local communities do not turn into authoritarian and inward-
looking islands or fortresses. 
Whereas Kennedy’s argument revolves around the relationship between the global and the 
local, Katz focuses his attention on a more specific area of concern— namely, education, that he 
rightly views as determining the nature of the debate about the good society or even the 
possibility of having such conversation at all. Katz strives to identify the ways to counter the 
colonization of Western knowledge and academia by the principles of instrumental rationality. 
He calls for a shift in the model of university education which has become subordinated to the 
imperatives of commodification and professional utility. In order to break the Weberian “iron 
cage” of instrumental rationality and the marketization drive that stifles creative thought and 
disinterested pursuit of knowledge, the university needs to return to its proper function as a place 
of value-laden debate over the shape of the good society. Katz invokes the idea of broad civic 
deliberation, which is closely associated with, and facilitated by, the practice of liberal arts 
education, and which should be valued as a necessary counterpart to narrow specialization and 
training in specific skills. Modes of political communication and participation in the USA have 
been dominated by technocratic objectives. In public life this has meant that consumer priorities 
have trumped those of the citizen; to restore the balance society must return to the orphaned 


























the foundational premises of liberal ideology, including the principle that individuals should 
enjoy equal rights and opportunities. It is vital to reflect back on both the apparent triumph of 
liberalism as well as the reputational damage it has suffered due to the rise to prominence of its 
neoliberal poor cousin. For Katz, the way for liberalism to regain its credentials as a humanist 
ideology, rather than an emaciated caricature of itself, is through deliberation and courageous 
enactment of civic culture that will help modern societies lessen their dependence on obsessive 
consumerism and rethink the principles to underpin a more sustainable form of collective life. 
Defense of liberalism is also at the heart of the contribution by Mach who focuses on Europe 
as a community resting on the values of the Enlightenment. According to Mach, to get out of its 
current crisis, the EU will have to commit itself to a firm and unequivocal deepening of its 
integration, even if this means losing some of its members. The Old Continent suffered enough 
under the Hobbesian “war of all against all,” and returning to that would be disastrous. Its post-
war integration, based on the principles of rule of law, democracy and human rights, has given 
Europe the longest-ever period of peace and stability; it is imperative to defend this against anti-
democratic, anti-liberal forces. At the time of writing (November 2020) there are some reasons to 
be optimistic—paradoxically, in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic. The EU’s rejection of 
rigid monetarism and its move towards a more interventionist economic policy, necessitated by 
the pandemic and dubbed by some, with a degree of exaggeration, as Europe’s “Hamiltonian 
moment” (Issing 2020), may help restore hope for a greater developmental convergence to 
narrow Europe’s North-South disparities caused by the flawed implementation of the common 
currency. However, the fundamental dilemma is yet to be settled: will the EU be a community of 
values based on the heritage of the Enlightenment, or will it accept the illiberal turn in some of its 
member states and hence abandon the community method in favor of a new path—one of 
political realism, competitive, and conflictual? Everything indicates that 2021 may be a turning 
point in this respect. 
Conclusion 
It has become almost cliché for progressive academics to challenge the political inertia caused by 
decades of neoliberal de-politicization by drawing on Gramscian strategies of counterhegemony. 
Clichés may be overused but that is usually because they convey useful insights fast. “Morbid 
symptoms,” that Gramsci described just before the Great Crash of 1929, seem to be here all over 
again, nine decades later. A time like this, while dysfunctional and oppressive in many ways, also 
provides a window of opportunity. The articles that follow point to several ways out of the mess 
we are in and offer the reader plenty of food for thought. We also hope that they will raise many 
questions, from which—as O’Byrne rightly says—“come possibilities.” We have no illusion as 
to how much impact an academic contribution, even a collective one like this volume, can have. 
However, let us keep in mind the moral of one of Aesop’s fables: slow and steady wins the race. 
While the progressive challengers of the neoliberal world order cannot match the material might 
of neoliberalism’s main constituencies, the corporation and the transnational capitalist class, they 
do have the ideational resources offered by the political traditions of socialism and modern 
liberalism, the capacity to think beyond what is empirically given and the power to shape 
people’s imagination. “For every ending there is a beginning”—O’Byrne aptly reminds us—and 
the end of neoliberalism will be no exception. 
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